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Improving Accountability in
the Solomon Islands: A Review of
Auditor-General Enabling Legislation
Colin Clark and Ken Levy
Abstract
Australian assistance to the Solomon Islands was provided in rebuilding of the
Office of the Auditor-General. To evaluate the progress, we analyse the relevant
legislation and oral evidence. The analysis reveals the issues underpinning
the Auditor- General ' role, including poor financial accounting systems,
weak internal/procedural controls and inadequate administrative/clerical
recording systems. A second set of issues pertains to conflict of interest by senior
government figures, impropriety by senior public servants and politicians
involving public monies, and a paucity of training of staff in systems,
procedures and ethical accounting practices. To rectify these shortcomings,
we propose modifications of existing legislation and strategies to improve the
efficiency of the Office of the Auditor-General.
I. Introduction
Corruption and its multiple damaging consequences in developing countries has
become an issue of increasing concern and interest, both among analysts and
policy-makers.'
Colin Clark is Professor of Accounting at Victoria University, Australia. Ken Levy is
Clinical Professor, Faculty of Law, Bond University, Australia.
P Mauro, 'Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further Research' (1998)
35 Finance rDevelopment 11.
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Every year US$20-40 billion is stolen from developing countries through
bribery, misappropriation of funds and other corrupt practices, and the extent
of annual worldwide corrupt transactions is close to US$1 trillion,' accounting
for up to 12% of the Gross Domestic Product of nations like Nigeria, Kenya
and Venezuela.4
Corruption reduces economic growth by lowering private investment, which
accounts for at least one-third of corruption's overall negative effects.5 Where
corruption occurs in the form of tax evasion, there is a corresponding shortage
of funds for productive investment. It leads to adverse budgetary consequences.
In consequence, fundamental needs such as food, health and education, are
not met.' Corruption discriminates against the poor by denying them access to
public services.'
Corruption encourages the overexploitation of forests, fisheries and farmlands
in pursuit of quick profits without regard to the long-term needs and livelihoods
of local populations, which has a devastating impact on the environment.o In
developing countries, such practices increase divisions among ethnic groups and
communities and lead to the breakdown of social cohesion.
Systemic corruption was investigated in the National Integrity System
Country Studies: Pacific Island Countries (NISPAC) conducted in 2004. That
study looked at the 11 pillars of public sector integrity including Parliaments
and Governments, and independent institutions such as Auditor-Generals and
the Judiciary." An assessment of Pacific Island countries, including the Solomon
2 World Bank, 'Corruption Fighters Tackle Stolen Asset Recovery, Elimination of Safe
Havens' (News & Broadcast, 9 June 2010); available at: http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22609142-pagePK:64257043-piPK:4
37376-theSitePK:4607,00.html.
D Kaufman, '10 Myths About Governance and Corruption' (2005) 42 Finance &
Development - A quarterly magazine of the IMF; available at: http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/fandd/2005/09/basics.htm.
A Nwabuzor, 'Corruption and Development: New Initiatives in Economic Openness
and Strengthened Rule of Law' (2005) 59 Ethics 121.
Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, 'Causes & consequences of corruption' (2010);
available at: http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/faq/faqsl.cfm#17 and D Frisch, 'The effects of
corruption on development' (1996) 158 The CourierACP-EU 68.
6 See Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (note 5 above).
KM Murphy, A Schleifer and RW Vishny, 'Why is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth'
(1993) 83 American Economic Review 409.
8 See Frisch (note 5 above).
9 See Anti-Corruption Resource Centre (note 5 above).
10 Ibid.
P Larmour and M Barcham, National Integrity System Pacifc Islands: Overview Report
(Transparency International Australia, Blackburn, 2004).
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Islands, revealed that corruption was a significant problem."
The Solomon Islands has a population of over 500,000 people living on 900
mountainous islands and coral atolls covering about 28,000km 2.13 The bulk of
the population depends on agriculture, fishing, and forestry for its livelihood.
Most manufactured goods and petroleum products must be imported. The
islands are rich in undeveloped mineral resources.'
From 1999-2003, civil conflict left the country almost bankrupt' 5 and
accelerated a decline in social conditions. Ethnic violence, the closing of
key businesses, and an empty government treasury culminated in economic
collapse. 6
The severity of the crisis has led some authors to argue that the Solomon
Islands was a failed state." In contrast, other commentators have contended
that the Solomon Islands is not a failed state," and that the 'patronage system
and associated corruption' are not 'an aberration or deviation' from other 'legal-
rational forms of governance'.
In 2003, the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)
was provided with a mandate, by the Solomon Islands and other nations of the
Pacific region, to address civil unrest, economic decline and dramatic decline
in service delivery and government administrative standards.20 Australian aid to
the Solomon Islands is delivered through a bilateral aid program in the areas of
health, education, economic livelihood, infrastructure and reform, as well as the
RAMSI.21
In 2010-11 AusAID's bilateral program will provide an estimated AU$50.9
million in aid. Other Australian assistance provided through RAMSI, AusAID's
regional and global programs and other Australian Government agencies such
12 P Larmour and M Barcham, 'National Integrity System in Small Pacific Island States'
(2006) 26 Public Administration and Development 173.
1 Australian Government AusAID, 'Solomon Islands Country Profile'; available at: http://
www.ausaid.gov.au/country/country.cfm?CountrylD= 16.
" BBC News Asia, 'Solomon Islands profile'; available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/country.profiles/1249307.stm.
1 Ibid.
16 See Australian Government AusAID (note 13 above).
J Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom: From Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon
Islands (Victoria University Press, Wellington, NZ, 2004) and J Roughan, 'Pacific First:
A Failed State' Solomon Star (13 February 2002).
M Nguyen, 'The Question of Filed States: Australia and the Notion of State Failure'
View on Asia Briefing Series (Uniya, 2005).
* S Hameiri, 'The Trouble with RAMSI: Reexamining the Roots of Conflict in Solomon
Islands' (2007) 19 The Contemporary Pacific 409.
20 Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI), 'RAMSI Brief' (undated).
21 See Australian Government AusAID (note 13 above).
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as the Australian Federal Police, Treasury and Customs, brings total estimated
expenditure in 2010-11 to AU$225.6 million.22
The Accountability Program: Program Framework Document, 23 within
the RAMSI Machinery of Government pillar, includes the Auditor-General,
Ombudsman, and Leadership Code Commission, and sets out details of the
program and the context in which a review of the Auditor-General's enabling
legislation occurred in 2007. The Accountability Program was informed by the
Report of a Review of Accountability Institutions of the Solomon Islands.24
RAMSI assisted in the rebuilding of the Office of the Auditor-General, which
had largely become inactive because of the deterioration in the resourcing of the
Office since the mid-1990s, through building staff levels.25
Following the introduction above, the present research, the research process
and methodology are outlined. The evidence, both documentary and oral, is
outlined, and was presented more fully in a report previously prepared by the
authors. The relevant legislation is discussed. The evidence is then analysed and
then conclusions and recommendations are provided.
II. Methodology
Consultations were undertaken with stakeholders, to ascertain perceptions
of limitations and initial proposals for change to the current legislation. The
stakeholders were: the Auditor-General; the Deputy Auditor-General; the Office
of the Auditor-General; Sir Peter Kenilorea, Speaker of the Solomon Islands
Parliament and former Prime Minister; the Ministry of Finance and Treasury;
the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Public Service; the Permanent Secretary,
Department of Prime Minister; Research and Committee Officers, National
Parliament of the Solomon Islands; the Integrity Group Forum (the Auditor-
General, the Ombudsman, the Leadership Code Commission, the Central Bank,
the Prison Service, the Police Service and the Director of Public Prosecutions);
the Investigation Management Advisor, Leadership Code Commission; the
Legislative Drafter, Leadership Code Commission; the Director of Public
Prosecutions; the Acting Accountant General, Treasury Division; the Public
Accounts Committee Member and Leader of the Opposition; the Institute of
22 ibid.
23 Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI), 'Accountability Program: Program Framework
Document' (September 2006).
24 JTD Wood, 'Report of a Review of Accountability Institutions of the Solomon Islands'
Technical Assistance Governance Facility for Solomon Islands, Honiara (2005).
25 Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI), 'RAMSI Medium Term Strategy: an Overview of
the Process' PowerPoint Slides (undated).
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Solomon Islands Accountants; RAMSI Senior Development Program Specialist;
Partner, PricewaterhouseCoopers; members of CPA Australia; Group Audit
Directors; the United Nations Development Program; and the Parliamentary
Strengthening Program.
The existing Solomon Islands legislation was examined and the previous draft
amendments developed in 2000 were considered. Having identified the issues to
be addressed in the current legislation, legislation in other jurisdictions within
the Pacific and Australia have been examined, noting suitability for the Solomon
Islands environment.
This report uses a framework developed by English and Guthrie 26 to
consider the powers required to conduct audits (the mandate to perform audits;
independence from direction by the executive; funding of the Auditor-General)
and accountability mechanisms available to parliament (the scope of audit in
the public sector; powers of parliament in relation to audit; funding determined
by parliament; oversight of the Auditor-General). The model involves a
categorization of factors in the analysis of the evidence, and to highlight the
major issues for a contemporary Auditor-General function in the Solomon
Islands.
This framework has been used to examine the enabling legislation of
supreme audit institutions at a national level for European countries;27 African
countries;2 8 Asian countries;2 9 Australian states and territories,30 as wel as to
compare the independence and accountability provisions of Auditor-General
enabling legislation against those of other statutory officers of parliament.31
The legislation examined in those studies has informed the present analysis of
the present Solomon Islands legislation and the development of recommended
reforms.
26 L English and J Guthrie, 'Mandate, independence, and Funding: Resolution of a
Protracted Struggle between Parliament and the Executive over the Powers of the
Australian Auditor-General' (2000) 59 Australian journal ofPublic Administration 98.
27 C Clark, M De Martinis and M Krambia-Kapardis, 'Audit Quality Attributes of
European Union Supreme Audit Institutions' (2007) 19 European Business Review 40.
28 C Clark, M De Martinis and R Kiraka, 'Transformation of Public Sector Auditing
in Southern African Countries: Comparing the Independence and Accountability of
Supreme Audit Institutions' (2003) 38 Journal of Public Administration (South Africa)
118.
29 R Kiraka, C Clark and M De Martinis, 'Public Sector Auditing, Accountability and
Independence: a Study of ASEAN Countries' (2002) 10 Asian Review ofAccounting 43.
30 M De Martinis and C Clark, 'The Accountability and Independence of the Auditors-
General of Australia: A Comparison of their Enabling Legislation' (2003) 13 Australian
Accounting Review 26.
3 C Clark and M De Martinis, 'A Framework for Reforming the Independence and
Accountability of Statutory Officers of Parliament: A Case Study of Victoria' (2003) 62
Australian Journal ofPublic Administration 32.
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The evidential process consisted of oral evidence from the key stakeholders
and their representatives, as well as analysis of the legislative provisions
governing the Auditor-General's functions and operations. The present research
took account of the strategic planning process for the Office of the Auditor-
General32 together with a review of the budget and structure of the accounts for
the government.
III. Analysis
The role and efficacy of the Auditor-General's Office in the Solomon Islands
has been an issue of long standing. For example, at the time of undertaking the
legislative review, the accounts for some ministries had been last audited in the
period 1997-99, while some provincial government accounts had their accounts
last audited in the period 1989-95. For state owned enterprises and statutory
authorities, some of these audits date back to the 1996-98 period.
The option of establishing a National Audit Office (NAO) has been revisited
a number of times. In 1985, the Cabinet considered the establishment of an
NAO but decided against that proposal, noting that there were good reasons to
enhance the Auditor-General's powers.
Subsequently, in February 2000, the Cabinet considered a draft bill which
had the objective of the enactment of a National Audit Act providing for:
* the establishment of an NAO, as a statutory body, independent of the public
service and headed by the Auditor-General;
* the Auditor-General's power to conduct performance audits and to determine
staffing, including numbers and salaries;
* the NAO to operate on a user pays basis charging audit fees, with
that revenue to the Auditor-General being supplemented through the
appropriation process;
* the oversight of the NAO performance, especially by the Public Accounts
Committee; and
* the Public Accounts Committee role to include examination of the Auditor-
General's resource requirements given the Work Plan and the proposed
employment conditions for staff of the Auditor-General's Office.34
The rationale for these proposed reforms was the long standing difficulties in
32 Office of the Auditor-General, 'Strategic Audit Plan and Tactical Audit Plan 2008-2012'
(November 2007).
33 State Owned Enterprises Act 2007.
31 Submissions and Briefing Notes on Proposed Audit Legislation 1999-2000.
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staffing the audit office, the need to strengthen the public sector audit function
as part of the government's reform agenda, and to create a strong Auditor-
General to re-establish public and donor confidence in the Solomon Islands
accountability processes. Despite the apparent approval by the Cabinet of these
reforms, it appears that amendment of the legislation has not been progressed
due to the recent social problems which diverted previous government priorities
and resources.
Relevant legislation
Section 108 of the Constitution of the Solomon Islands35 provides for the
Auditor-General's Office as being a public office and sets out the means of
appointment of the Auditor-General, the scope of entities subject to audit,
information gathering powers, reporting arrangements, the Auditor-General's
freedom from direction, and provides Parliament with the authority to prescribe
other functions to the Auditor-General. In addition, the Public Finance and
Audit Act (Cap 120) 197836 also sets out the more detailed provisions relating
the Auditor-General.
As for other ancillary legislation that gives support to actions arising
from reports of the Auditor-General, particularly those reports identifying
misconduct or corruption, the Leadership Code Commission Act addresses the
integrity of public servants, statutory office holders and members of Parliament.
Public servants' conduct is also regulated by the Public Service Act and
Regulations.
Efficacy of the constitutionalprovisions
Chapter X of the Constitution deals with 'Finance'. Within that chapter,
s 100 makes it clear that all revenues or other monies received for government
purposes should be accounted for in the Solomon Islands Consolidated Fund.
The only other variation to that intention is where Parliament has specifically, by
legislation, made provision for the maintenance of 'special funds': s 100(1) and
(2). The administration of those funds, at the close of each financial year, is to
be maintained separately in either the Consolidated Fund or in trust or special
funds: s 100(3).
The Constitution provides in s 108 that there shall be an Auditor-General
and that office shall be a 'public office'. Also, the public accounts of the Solomon
Islands, specified to be for all ministries, officers, courts and authorities of
3 The Solomon Islands Independence Order 1978.
36 Public Finance and Audit Act (Cap 120) 1978 (1996 ed).
3 Office of the Auditor-General, 'An Auditor-Generals Insight into Corruption in Solomon
Islands Government', National Parliament Paper No 48 (October 2007).
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the government and all provincial governments 'shall' be audited annually by
the Auditor-General or a person authorised by him: s 108(3). Section 108(4)
provides a specific power and a requirement to the Auditor-General, to submit
to the Speaker of Parliament all such annual reports, and to provide a copy of
any such reports to the Minister for Finance and the relevant portfolio minister.
In the carrying out of those functions, the Auditor-General '... shall not be
subject to the direction or control of any other person in authority': s 108(5).
Additionally, the Auditor-General is not constrained in carrying out other
functions as Parliament may prescribe: s 108(6). In summary, s 108 makes the
Auditor-General's powers quite explicit.
Comment on other Constitutional provisions
Many interviewees raised concern about a lack of integrity of former ministers
and public servants, and asserted instances of financial impropriety in the
accounting for public funds.
The case outlined above is concerned with a technical breach rather than an
ability to deal with official corruption. The Constitutional provisions (Chaps
VIII and IX) make clear the responsibilities of office for those office holders
listed in s 93. There are also requirements for declarations of conflicts of interest
(s 95), suggesting that the statutory provisions are sufficient to deal with the
complaints raised.
The Leadership Code (Further Provisions) Act 1999 makes detailed provision
for investigation of complaints and hearings by the Commission followed, if
necessary, by a court declaration of penalty. The Ombudsman Act also provides
for an independent statutory officer to investigate complaints which cannot
be resolved with government ministries. These powers or mechanisms are in
addition to those relating to public servants, contained in Chap XIII of the
Constitution and the detailed statutory and rigid provisions of the Public Service
Act and Regulations.
Comments on the Public Finance andAuditAct
The provisions of the Public Finance and Audit Act, for the most part, are
consistent with s 108 of the Constitution. The obligations of the Auditor-
General are provided for in the Constitution.
However, s 35(2) provides that the Auditor-General will not be required
to audit the accounts of a trust or other funds as envisaged by s 108(3) of the
Constitution unless the person administering the fund has been directed by the
responsible minister to prepare, sign and transmit those accounts to the Auditor-
General. This provision appears to be inconsistent with the Constitution
and therefore may be void, unless, after reading the relevant section of the
Constitution, s 35(2) can be limited in its application to trust funds (or other
funds).
However, in the provisions dealing with statutory bodies, s 47(1), consistent
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with the Constitution, provides that '... the accounts of any such body
corporate shall be examined and audited by the Auditor-General'. The process
envisaged in the Constitution of the Auditor-General submitting annual reports
to the Speaker for tabling in Parliament, is confirmed in this section of the Act.
While s 47(3) of the Act provides that the Auditor-General must submit the
report to the Minister and to the body corporate, s 47(5) further provides that if
the minister fails within a reasonable time to present the accounts of a statutory
body, then the Auditor-General must transmit a copy to the Speaker to lay
before the Parliament.
State Owned Enterprises Act
In addition, s 35(2) appears to be inconsistent with the State Owned Enterprises
Act where, the state owned enterprise board must deliver an annual report and
audited financial statements to the responsible minister within three months
of the close of a financial year. Section 20 of that Act empowers the Auditor-
General to audit '...every State owned enterprise and every subsidiary of every
state owned enterprise'. Although the list of state owned enterprises set out in
Sch 2 to the State Owned Enterprises Act may not be exhaustive, it is clear that
the intention of Parliament is that the Auditor-General should be independent
and empowered to audit all public funds, as specified in following sections:
* s 108 of the Constitution;
* s 34 of the Public Finance and Audit Act; and
* s 20 of the State Owned Enterprises Act.
Scope of audit
The commentary above indicates that the scope of the Auditor-General's audit
activities is not restricted. Legislative amendment should improve clarity in
certain not overly significant areas which will be dealt with in the Conclusion.
The comments on the evidence are set out below.
Entities
According to Sir Peter Kenilorea, the Parliament had always intended to
empower its Auditor-General to audit all 'government' bodies, or at least those
which have the use of public monies. This evidence is most significant in
determining the intention of Parliament as Sir Peter was the inaugural Prime
Minister of the Solomon Islands and impressed as a man of great integrity. He
was certainly in a position to know the intention of Parliament at the time the
original audit legislation was passed and considerable weight should be placed
on his evidence.
A majority of interviewees perceived the lack of power of the Auditor-General
and the scope of audit, at the expense of public interest. Section 35(2) of the
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Public Finance and Audit Act does not empower the Auditor-General to audit
trust or other funds where the relevant Minister has not directed the preparation
and transmission of the accounts to the Auditor-General.
In addition, there are a number of government entities which are
corporations, yet the Auditor-General is not a registered company auditor and
therefore is not able to audit such entities. The interviewees suggested that at
least some government funded Non Government Organisations, eg sporting
bodies, should be audited by the Auditor-General because of the materiality of
the government grants provided.
During the course of the inquiry concerning the efficacy of the Auditor-
General legislation, it was understood that the State Owned Enterprises Act
2007 was proclaimed. The legislative power for the Auditor-General to audit
previously non-audited government funded corporations (Solomon Airlines)
and other statutory bodies has been rectified.
Despite perceptions of the lack of power for the Auditor-General, the
Constitution and the Public Finance and Audit Act are quite robust, as
demonstrated by provision in s 108 of the Constitution and strengthened by
the power in ss 47 and 20 of the State Owned Enterprises Act. There does not
seem to be a need in the law for the Auditor-General to be a registered company
auditor for that purpose. This may become a requirement, as provided for in the
Public Finance and Audit Act (Cap 120) 1978 should there be any challenge in
that area.
Similarly, the involvement of the Auditor-General in the audit of 'trust and
other funds' (s 35(2) of the Public Finance and Audit Act) could be expanded
by making specific provision in the enabling legislation of the particular fund or
trust.
Types offunds
The interviewees noted the apparent lack of complete recording and audit
of some donated funds, where the Solomon Islands government is either the
recipient or donor. Evidence indicates, if true, some impropriety in the use of
funds, in particular in the 'Consolidated Development Expenditure' part of the
National Accounts, which in 2008 approximated SBD$380 million. Of that, it
was reported that over SBD$100 million of the recipient funds, from external
governments, may not have been properly accounted for or used.
Similarly, there has been little or no audit of parliamentary entitlements, a
further type of fund.
Donated funds where the Solomon Islands Government
is the recipient
The risk of fraud or improper accounting is not apparent in projects directly
controlled by agencies, eg the Asian Development Bank. However, if monies
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are channelled through a government agency then there needs to be adequate
controls and audit. Alternatively, aid agencies may appoint an auditor of their
choosing to verify the expenditure of donated funds.
It was apparent that poor controls existed in relation to the Constituency
Development Fund where some monies, sourced from an overseas government,
were allocated to Members of Parliament for expenditure at their own
discretion. Undoubtedly, any such claim should be referred to the Leadership
Code Commission and investigated. A prohibition of that practice, including
a legislative remedy, should be implemented. Therefore, the Auditor-General
should be empowered to audit such funds, regardless of whether the donor
organisation has its own auditor. Further improvements could be made if there
is agreement with the donor organisation and the Auditor-General about the
scope and conduct of audits.
Funds donated by the Solomon Islands Government
The government donates funds, frequently in substantial amounts, to external
bodies, for example sporting organisations. There is a perception that there are
incidents of these monies being allocated on the basis of personal and political
relationships and influences rather than objective criteria.
In addition, the use of those monies has not been subject to audit. It is
important that a policy be established to audit the grants where the amounts are
material.
Parliamentary entitlements
The audit of parliamentary entitlements, although an issue of sensitivity, would
provide compliance with statutory entitlements. A regular audit of these would
not divert resources from other important areas of the Auditor-General's
responsibility.
IV. Powers of the Parliament in Relation to Audit
Appointment and oversight of the Auditor-General
The constitutional powers in relation to oversight of the Auditor-General are
similar to those in other jurisdictions. There is separation of power between
the government and the Auditor-General and a mechanism to provide effective
oversight.
Power to request audits
While it appears that there is no specific power for special audits to be requested
of the Auditor-General, s 108(6) specifically clarifies the intention of Parliament
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that 'nothing ... shall prevent' the Auditor-General from undertaking 'other
functions in relation to the accounts ... as may be prescribed by Parliament',
and to undertake '... other functions in relation to the supervision and control
of expenditure from public funds ... as may be prescribed'.
V. Oversight of the Auditor-General
Independent audit of the Auditor- General
Annual audits of the Office of the Auditor-General are governed by the general
provisions38 which apply to all other public service ministries and agencies, other
than state owned enterprises.
Since the Public Finance and Audit Act (Cap 120) 1978 does not make any
provision for such periodic performance reviews, a statutory provision should be
enacted to provide for the Parliament to appoint independent auditor of Office
of the Auditor-General, and report to the Parliamentary Audit Committee.
VI. Mandate to Perform Audits
Terms and conditions of the Office ofthe Auditor-General staff
The Office of the Auditor-General staff are officers of the public service, similar
to like offices in other jurisdictions. The Public Service Commissioner has
control over the head count and classification levels of staff within the Office of
the Auditor-General.
The interviewees pointed to the inability in recruiting competent audit staff,
due to comparatively low salary levels. Given the imperatives for the Office of
the Auditor-General in having adequate resources, appropriate Government
policy, formulated by the Public Service Commissioner, would promote the
recruitment and retention of the most capable auditors in the market. This
might include the development of a specialist scale of salary for auditors at
an overall competitive funding level, commensurate with qualifications and
experience, and recommended by a parliamentary audit committee.
38 Office of the Auditor-General, 'Status of Audits of Solomon Islands Government Entities
as at 30 June 2007' National Parliament Paper No 34 (August 2007).
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Cost recovery from auditees
The current practice of the Auditor-General recovering costs through fee
charging for audits of statutory bodies, state owned enterprises and provincial
governments is consistent with that adopted currently by other like organisations
in public sectors in many countries.
Presently, financial statements of Ministries are not prepared and audited. If
that practice changes in future, then the possibility of cost recovery should be
determined as a matter of government policy.
VII. Other Factors Affecting the Effectiveness of
the Auditor-General
There appears to be inadequate follow up of recommendations of the Auditor-
General's reports by auditee agencies, the Public Accounts Committee or the
Parliament. This strengthens the argument for a specific parliamentary audit
committee. At the least, the powers of the present Public Accounts Committee
to summon accounting officers could be extended to provide the power to
summon ministers.
Compulsory professional development, initiated under the authority of the
Speaker, should be available to parliamentarians to assist in overcoming the lack
of knowledge about the roles and functions of the Auditor-General.
The operational effectiveness of the Office of the Auditor-General could be
enhanced through establishment of policy on quality control of audits, and
strengthened skills and competencies of the Office of the Auditor-General staff.
There is a need for internal auditing within Government and improving the
status of the auditing profession.
VIII. Non Audit Issues -
Ethical and.Financial Management Weaknesses
A number of important issues require attention in Solomon Islands public
administration if integrity in public sector accounting and auditing is to be of a
high standard, eg staffing structures and independence from the 'wantok' system;
skills and training of staff; upgraded computer equipment; lack of effective
internal controls; and a system to ensure quotations, appraisals and assessment
of quotes independently.
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IX. Misconduct and Enforceability Mechanisms
A number of interviewees were concerned about the ongoing corruption of
public servants and ministers and the absence of law to prevent it.
The audit function is legislatively sound, with adequate constitutional and
statutory provisions to enable action against public servants where a report of
impropriety is made (see the Public Service Act and Regulations) or against
politicians and public officers. The Leadership Code Commission Act empowers
the Leadership Code Commission to issue an ultimate sanction of banning the
person complained against from ever holding a position in the public sector in
the future. This is to be contrasted with the Public Service Act and Regulations
which are concerned with discipline provisions and may result in suspension,
and possible penalties of reprimand, fines or dismissal.
The Leadership Code Commission Act provides that everyone has a duty
to provide a declaration which discloses interests and conflicts of interests.
Therefore, the Auditor-General may make a complaint to the Leadership Code
Commission in respect of misconduct.
The Leadership Code Commission Act has a number of apparent weaknesses.
For example, it provides no capacity to enforce the Commission's orders against
misconduct; it has no power to compel attendance; and it has no power to
compel a person to give evidence. No adequate sanctions are provided for under
the Act. These could be rectified by merely promulgating such measures in the
Regulations which are authorised by s 38 of that Act.
It is concluded that most of the complaints are related to corrupt attitudes
and practices, which have become endemic but which can and should be
corrected. A power to issue a code of ethics for auditors should be a part of any
legislative review of the auditors powers and functions.
Ethical and financial weaknesses might be also addressed by adopting
strategies such as:
(i) having ministers report to Parliament about non achievement of financial
administration obligations of ministries and agencies within their
portfolios; and
(ii) enacting whistleblower legislation for the Solomon Islands public sector
to provide protection for those who report malpractice.
X. State of Accounting and Financial Reporting
Substantial evidence shows that some of the major shortcomings for the public
sector relate to:
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(i) complacency by officers in ministries and agencies;
(ii) inadequate systems used by ministries and central agencies; and
(iii) the training of staff which is grossly lacking.
Other shortcomings relate to internal controls and financial delegations for
expenditure. Policies and practices have to be determined and documented, and
supervisory positions created to ensure proper quotations, assessment of quotes,
proper approvals and independence in decision making. Also, checks for the
availability of funds prior to incurring expenditure must be enforced.
To prevent misappropriation of funds, strengthening of the internal controls
is required, as well as an effective process of recording and defining the bounds
of authority for all positions with respect to expenditure of public funds.
The capacity of accounting staff continues to be a problem, both in terms of
the skill level and in terms of the availability of accounting resources in day to
day transactions. The work of the Office of the Auditor-General raises queries
which require response, which, in turn, is slowing the work. Therefore, improved
training and systems can reduce the degree of audit queries.
There are numerous accounting practice and financial reporting issues that
will require legislative force to make the Government's systems effective. These
are dealt with later.
XI. Critical Systemic Functions
The computer-based systems in the Treasury, which are linked to the Ministries,
are now outdated and inefficient. Analysis of requirements and design of system
take time and money but will ultimately provide the government with good data
for improved decision making. This requires a commitment by Government to
provide the resourcing necessary to implement efficient systems.
These systems involve determining the types of transactions, the ledgers and
other records, and the general purpose and special purpose reports. A tiered
approach is required for systems development which includes:
* initial analysis;
* system design and documentation (administrative and electronic);
* audit consultation on accounting systems;
* systems evaluation and funding requirements;
* approval by Government of estimated capital costs;
* detailed design;
* training of staff, system documentation and helpdesk;
* implementation of system selected; and
* systems monitoring and evaluation of performance.
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To enable effective administrative systems there will be a need for:
* staff training/education in Treasury and line agencies;
* testing of systems;
* file conversion/data entry as required; and
* parallel running for a period until the new system is 'bedded down'.
XII. Consequential Legislative Action Required
While a number of the deficiencies identified require executive action, funding
and staffing resources to remedy the present position, the successful achievement
of these operational outcomes require legislative changes to the Public Finance
and Audit Act.
These changes provide an ideal opportunity to ensconce the appropriate
audit and financial administrative functions in separate statutes - one dealing
with audit powers and responsibilities for audit of the central and Provisional
Government, and one statute dealing with financial management issues.
However, no matter which legislative structure is selected, the provisions
requiring revision would essentially be the same.
Currently, only the National Accounts are prepared and tabled in Parliament,
while financial statements for each Government Ministry are not. This
fundamental deficiency in not preparing and presenting financial statements for
each Government agency should be rectified by legislation and in practice.
National audit legislation
Parts VI and VIII of the Public Finance and Audit Act would be transferred to a
National Audit Act (or other nomenclature), together with added functions such
as:
* the specification of more detailed powers and functions of the Auditor-
General in respect of Ministries, state owned enterprises and trust accounts;
* the clarification of administrative powers for Auditor-General, staff and
contractors where used;
* a clear power to audit Solomon Islands Government Ministries, statutory
authorities and provincial governments (and if necessary, all statutory bodies
covered by the legislation should be specified by regulation under the Act);
* the provisions concerning appointment and other incidents of office
including removal from office and the effect of this for superannuation
purposes;
* the obligation on the Auditor-General to report to Parliament, at least
annually, on failure of the Ministries and statutory authorities to present
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financial statements for audit by the prescribed date;
* an audit of Auditor-General's operations periodically;
* secrecy/confidentiality;
* the independence of Auditor-General to obtain his/her own legal advice;
* the scope of audits and inspection of accounts for verification of financial
statements;
* dealing with loans and trust funds;
* efficiency audits; and
* the penalties for maladministration.
Financial administration legislation
Expansion of Part VII of Public Finance and Audit Act might include:
* the specific requirement to prepare annual accounts of each Government
Ministry;
* the specific requirement to prepare annual consolidated accounts;
* the detailed requirement concerning records to be kept about all revenue and
expenditure in each Government Ministry and/or statutory authority;
* the requirements for maintenance of bank accounts for Government
Ministries, statutory authorities and provincial governments;
* any authorities, limitations and conditions for investment of public monies
outside the central Treasury function;
* ministerial obligations to report to Parliament on non achievement of
financial obligations in terms of finalisation of annual financial statements
and their submission to the Auditor-General for audit;
* the financial statements required to be prepared, including notes/
explanations to accounts;
* dealing with trust funds;
* dealing with loan funds;
* the declaration of private monies collected in an official capacity;
* the responsibilities of chief executive officers of Solomon Islands Ministries
and statutory authorities; and
* borrowing and investment by statutory agencies and provisional governments.
XIII. Conclusion
This study has focussed on the interaction with and the effectiveness of, levels
of governance and management. The outcomes point to shortcomings by
Ministerial intervention where nepotism and corruption is perceived internally
and externally. The Office of Auditor-General is seen to be diminished in this
context.
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The analysis of the evidence reveals two main concerns with respect to the
effectiveness of the Auditor-General's role and the staff of the Office of the
Auditor-General:
1. issues underpinning the Auditor-General's role - this refers to inadequacies in
financial management of Government funded organisations and specifically
poor financial accounting systems; weak internal/procedural controls; and
inadequate administrative/clerical recording systems; and
2. conflict of interest by some senior government figures, impropriety by senior
public servants and politicians involving public monies; a paucity of training
of staff in systems, procedures and ethical accounting practices.
Our findings are contrary to that argument and is based on a more micro
level analysis of both public service functioning and of the ministerial mode
of operation. Our findings do not make conclusions about the social and
cultural dynamics or of 'patronage networks', although we met with and were
conscious of those dynamics. We did, however, reach different conclusions
about the efficacy and standard of the professional practices adopted in the
Solomon Islands Government (including the Public Service) with respect
to accounting and auditing. The manifestation of the role of the Office of
Auditor-General within the constitutional structure appears structurally sound,
but it is, in our view, less open and accountable than it is in most developed
democracies. Indeed, it has tended to exclude the Auditor-General where some
senior ministers have found it convenient. Those in the public service seem to
acknowledge this also.
The fundamental underpinning of our findings about effective change for the
future is based on overcoming the identified weaknesses in legislation, relevant
systems or practices. Strengthening these areas should enable the Office of the
Auditor-General to pursue its mandate effectively and with probity, ensuring the
independence of the Auditor-General and giving confidence in the population
that their interests are governed properly and honestly.
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